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PFIZER, INC. v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA: THE 
ABILITY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO SUE 
UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust legislation in the United States . was enacted to pro-
mote a free market system. 1 In furtherance of this goal, section 4 of 
the Clayton Act2 confers upon persons injured by anticompetitive 
practices the right to sue for treble damages.3 Congress imposed this 
harsh penalty on wrongdoers to deter potential violators and to 
supply greater enforcement than the government alone could pro-
vide. 4 To achieve its purpose, the legislation was made broad in its 
terms and coverage. 5 Interpretation, application, and development 
of the Sherman6 and Clayton7 Acts were left to the courts.8 The Acts 
have been liberally construed with a greater view towards results 
than judicial exception. 9 Recently the Supreme Court utilized these 
1. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), the Court stated: 
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic 
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It 
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield 
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality 
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment 
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. 
See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); C. KAYSEN & D. 
TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 11-20 (1959); Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 377, 381-84 (1965). 
2. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1976). 
3. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States 
... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained ... . "Id. § 4. 
4. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); E. TIMBER-
LAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 10-11 (1965). 
5. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Sugar Crystal Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948). 
6. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1976). 
7. 15 u.s.c. §§ 12-18 (1976). 
8. See A. KALES, CONTRACTS AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE 106f (1918); H. 
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 228-29 (1955). 
9. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977); FMC 
v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Confer-
ence, 383 U.S. 213, 217-18, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966); W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 
F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
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broad policies in order to allow application of the Clayton Act in 
treble damage action suits brought by foreign governments. 
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 10 the Court held that 
foreign governments can sue for antitrust violations committed 
against them. In Pfizer, three foreign governments sued six Ameri-
can pharmaceutical firms alleging that the companies conspired to 
monopolize and restrain trade in tetracycline, a broad spectrum 
antibiotic. The companies countered by challenging the right of the 
foreign governments to sue, contending that sovereigns are not 
"persons" under the Clayton Act. In its majority decision 11 the Su-
preme Court upheld the foreign governments' right to sue. 12 
The Court drew upon case law, statutory construction, legisla-
tive history, and its interpretation of the purposes behind the anti-
trust Acts to discern the meaning of "persons" in section 4. The 
Pfizer holding arguably stands for the proposition that foreign gov-
ernments have standing to sue for treble damages whenever they are 
injured by anticompetitive practices. Stricter interpretation of 
Pfizer gives foreign governments standing under the Clayton Act 
only under compelling circumstances. Although the need for com-
pelling circumstances was not directly addressed, the Court stated 
that the concern of foreign governments for the health and safety of 
their citizenry gave these countries no choice but to deal with the 
anticompetitive drug companies. 13 This Note will show that the 
Court's opinion should be liberally construed, thereby granting for-
eign governments the right to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act 
whenever they are injured by American anticompetitive practices. 
II. PFIZER, INC. v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 
The governments of India, Iran, and the Philippines brought 
separate actions against six pharmaceutical manufacturers alleging 
that the companies conspired to constrain domestic and foreign 
trade in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of broad spectrum 
antibiotics, in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 14 For 
10. 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
11. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion of the Court in which Justices White, 
Marshall, and Stevens joined. Chief Justice Burger was joined in his dissent by Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Powell, who also dissented separately. Justice Blackmun took no part 
in the decision of the case. 
12. 434 U.S. at 308. 
13. Id. at 318 n.18. 
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976) . Each respondent also sued in a parens patriae capacity. 
Those claims were dismissed in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 615-20 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976). 
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practical purposes these actions were consolidated. 15 As an affirma-
tive defense, the drug companies asserted that foreign governments 
were not "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages. The trial 
court certified this question for an interlocutory appeal. 16 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that 
foreign nations are "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages. 17 
Its decision was affirmed en bane. 18 
In affirming the lower court's decision, 19 the Supreme Court 
relied on the statutory construction of section 4 of the Clayton Act, 
which states: 
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor 
in any district court ... without respect to the amount in contro-
versy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, 
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 20 
The Court's inquiry concerning this section of the Clayton Act cen-
tered on the meaning of the word "person." Since there is no legisla-
tive history responsive to the definition of "person," the Court ex-
amined the broad scope of the antitrust acts. As a result of the Act's 
15. Pfizer originated from the "Antibiotic Antitrust Actions," in which a large number 
of foreign governments sued the drug companies for anticompetitive activities. See Pfizer, 
Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 533-34 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972). These actions 
were consolidated in In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 
Misc. Order No. 74-31 (D. Minn. 1974) and in In re Coordinated Proceedings in Antibiotic 
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Three interlocutory orders arose from 
the District Court in Minnesota questioning the ability of foreign governments to sue for 
treble damages. They were: In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust 
Actions, Misc. Order No. 74-31 (D. Minn. 1974) (Philippines v. Pfizer, Inc.); Misc. Order 
No. 74-37 (D. Minn. 1974) (Iran v. Pfizer, Inc.); In the Coordinated Cases and IndiR, Misc. 
Order No. 75-48 (D. Minn. 1974) (India v. Pfizer, Inc.). These orders were reviewed by the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting en bane, 550 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976). The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, 97 S. Ct. 1643 (1977), and subsequently upheld the foreign 
governments' right to sue, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
16. 550 F.2d at 397 n.2. The interlocutory appeal was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b), which states: 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appeala-
ble under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling 
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and 
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate deter-
mination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of 
Appeals may thereupon . . . permit an appeal . . . . 
28 u.s.c. § 1292(b) (1970). 
17. 550 F.2d at 399. 
18. Id. at 400. 
19. 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
20. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1976). 
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remedial purpose, the Court had previously interpreted the law lib-
erally, relying on its purpose, legislative history, and recognized 
canons of construction. 21 
Upon reviewing these aids of construction, the majority of the 
Court in Pfizer stated that foreign nations have a right to sue under 
the antitrust laws of the United States. Although legislative history 
reveals that the Sherman Act was enacted to protect the American 
people,22 nevertheless, foreign corporations are included within the 
meaning of "persons" and are entitled to sue for treble damages. 2:i 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the direct protection of 
American citizens was the sole purpose behind the Act. In Illinois 
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 24 the Supreme Court stated that the purposes 
behind section 4 were to deter violators and to compensate victims 
for their injuries caused by antitrust illegalities. 25 Granting foreign 
governments the right to sue creates an additional deterrent to anti-
competitive practices, which ultimately benefits the American con-
sumer.28 
Sovereignty is not a basis for denying treble damage recovery. 
In United States v. Cooper Corp., 27 the Supreme Court held that the 
United States could not maintain a treble damage action under 
section 7 of the Sherman Act. 28 The Court distinguished Cooper in 
Georgia v. Evans, 29 where a state was allowed to sue for treble dam-
ages. Though specific remedies were given to the United States 
under the Sherman Act,30 the states were not afforded any statutory 
rights. For example, the United States could press criminal charges 
to deter violation of the antitrust Act, but the states' only basis for 
recovery was to sue as a "person" under section 4 of the Clayton 
Act. 31 Foreign governments were considered to be in an analogous 
position to the states, and, therefore, were granted the right to sue 
for treble damages.32 
21. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941), quoted in 434 U.S. at 316. 
22. See 21 CONG. REC. 2597-2600 (1890). 
23. 15 u.s.c. § 12 (1976). 
24. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
25. Id. at 746. 
26. 434 U.S. at 314. 
27. 312 U.S. 600 (1941). 
28. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 
29. 316 U.S. 159 (1942). 
30. The United States has the power to criminally prosecute antitrust violators under 
section 3, to enjoin anticompetitive activity under section 4, and to seize goods in interstate 
commerce that are in violation of the Act under section 6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 6 (1976). 
31. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 
32. 434 U.S. at 318. 
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In his dissenting opinion in Pfizer, Chief Justice Burger stated 
that neither legislative history nor canons of statutory construction 
supported the majority's decision that foreign governments had the 
right to sue for treble damages.33 Additionally, he argued that the 
right was not specified in section 4 of the Clayton Act. Congress 
could have included foreign nations within the definition of 
"person," but they did not consider the question. Chief Justice 
Burger was troubled by "[ t]he conversion of this silence in 1890 
into an affirmative intent in 1978 . . . . "34 The dissenting justices 
also questioned the analogy between foreign governments and indi-
vidual American states, and were unwilling to expand the right of 
a treble damage remedy without express Congressional approval.35 
III. THE MEANING OF "PERSONS" 
In Pfizer, the Court held that foreign governments are 
"persons" within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. The 
criteria used to interpret the meaning of "person" had been enumer-
ated in a prior case as: "[t]he purpose, the subject matter, the 
context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of 
the statute . . . . "36 These aids for statutory interpretation were 
employed by the Pfizer Court in reaching its decision. 
A. Case Law 
The Court in Pfizer did not question the long-standing common 
law right of foreign governments to participate as parties in United 
States courts, 37 nor did it question the position of foreign govern-
ments once they are in court. 38 Sovereignty is not a basis for denying 
foreign governments access to American courts.39 Indeed, once a 
government submits itself to an American court it must stand in the 
same position as a private litigant.'0 The assertion of sovereign im-
33. Id. at 326. 
34. Id. at 324-25. 
35. Id. at 329. 
36. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941) (footnote omitted). 
37. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1964); 
The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164, 167 (1870); Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 399 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 571 (1927); Swiss Confederation v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 
235, 236 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 517 (1947). 
38. See generally Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976); The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1976). 
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1976). See Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits of Judicial 
Control·-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 441-43 (1977). 
40. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1976) . See 
Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976). 
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munity does not act to completely shield a foreign government from 
liability. Congress has adopted a narrow approach to the doctrine 
of sovereignty and has denied foreign governments the use of that 
defense when they act in their proprietary capacity.41 Once a govern-
ment subjects itself to the jurisdiction of a court, 42 its liability may 
be such as to expose it to antitrust claims. 43 
Prior to the Clayton Act, foreign governments acting in their 
proprietary capacity were able to sue American companies in Amer-
ican courts for unfair competitive practices. 44 In addition, sovereigns 
have been able to sue under statutes where their rights were not 
specifically defined. 45 Applying these criteria to Pfizer, the absence 
of specific enabling language in the Clayton Act did not bar the 
governments from relief in view of the proprietary nature of their 
actions. 48 
The United States, while acting in its commercial capacity, was 
denied the right to sue' for treble damages under section 7 of the 
Sherman Act.47 However, "any person" is allowed to sue under the 
Clayton Act. 48 "Person" is defined in the legislation "to include 
corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the 
laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, 
the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country." 411 In 
41. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1976). 
42. Id. §§ 1605, 1607. 
43. See w. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 111-14 (2d ed. 1973). 
44. See French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903); La Repub-
lique Francaise v. Schultz, 94 F. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1899), aff'd, 102 F. 153 (2d Cir. 1900); City 
of Carlsbad v. Schultz, 78 F. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1897); City of Carlsbad v. Kut.now, 68 F. 794 
(S.D.N.Y.), af{'d, 71 F. 167 (2d Cir. 1895). 
45. In Swiss Confederation v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 235 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 332 
U.S. 815 (1947), the court was asked to decide whether a foreign government could sue in 
the Court of Claims. The court stated: 
A foreign government might be unwilling to submit itself to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of the United States, but if it is willing to do so, we can conceive of no 
reason why Congress should have intended to prohibit a court established by it from 
giving to the foreign government the same redress which would be accorded to any 
other litigant. 
Id. at 236-37. See California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-86 (1944) (Shipping Act of 
1916); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369-70 (1934) (revenue statutes); Ruhl v. Railroad 
Retirement Bd., 342 F.2d 662, 664-66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 836 (1965) (Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1937). 
46. See 434 U.S. at 314. 
47. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941). Section 7 of the Sherman Act 
was repealed since it was redundant in view of section 4 of the Clayton Act. Act of July 7, 
1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283. See S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955). 
48. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1976). 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976). 
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Cooper, 50 the Court held that the United States did not fall within 
this definition: "in common usage, the term 'person' does not in-
clude the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily 
construed to exclude it."51 It was reasoned that if Congress had 
intended the United States to be a person it would have specifically 
included language to that effect. The Sherman Act contains two 
distinct causes of action, one for the individual and one for the 
government. 52 
Although the United States was denied standing to sue for tre-
ble damages, the Court allowed individual states to do so in Evans. 53 
Cooper was distinguished as deciding only the rights of the United 
States: "It was not held that the word 'person,' abstractly consid-
ered, could not include a governmental body. " 54 Specific remedies 
were granted to the United States by the Sherman Act. For exam-
ple, the United States may obtain an injunction, prosecute crimi-
nally, and seize those goods in interstate commerce which were in 
violation of the Act. 55 Since they were given specific relief, it seemed 
illogical to include the United States in provisions of the Act where 
they were not mentioned. 56 By these measures, Congress granted the 
United States an adequate remedy to deter anticompetitive activ-
ity. However, if the states were denied standing to sue they would 
be left without any redress. 57 The Court in Evans could find no 
reason why Congress would deprive a state purchaser a remedy 
which was available to other purchasers.58 
The Pfizer Court found foreign governments to be in an analo-
gous position to the states whenever such governments were victim-
ized by anticompetitive practices within the United States. Both 
have as their sole remedy a suit for treble damages. The Pfizer Court 
reworded its declaration in Evans, substituting the words "foreign 
nations" for "states": 
50. 312 U.S. 600 (1941). 
51. Id. at 604 (footnote omitted). 
52. Id. at 606, 608. 
53. 316 U.S. 159 (1942). 
54. Id. at 161. 
55. 15 u.s.c. §§ 3, 4, 6 (1976). 
56. 312 U.S. at 606-07. 
57. 316 U.S. at 162. 
58. Id. at 162-63. See Cotten v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229 (1850), where the 
Court stated: "It would present a strange anomaly indeed, if, having the power to make 
contracts and hold property as other persons, natural and artificial, they were not entitled to 
the same remedies for their protection." Id. at 231. 
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We can perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted 
to deprive a [foreign nation], as purchaser of commodities shipped 
in [international] commerce, of the civil remedy of treble damages 
which is available to other purchasers who suffer through violation 
of the Act .... Nothing in the Act, its history, or its policy, could 
justify so restrictive a construction of the word 'person' in§ 7 .... 
Such a construction would deny all redress to a [foreign nation], 
when mulcted by a violator of the Sherman Law, merely because it 
is a [foreign nation]. 59 
The dissent did not propose that the analogy between foreign 
nations and states entitled both political entities to similar relief 
against anticompetitive activities. 60 Different treatment of the two 
political units would be supported only if Congress intended differ-
ent policy considerations toward each. Chief Justice Burger noted 
that Congress did not consider whether foreign nations or individual 
American states could sue for treble damages. 61 However, denying 
American states a remedy would deny surrogate protection of Amer-
ican citizens by the states. Since the primary purpose behind the 
Sherman Act was to protect the American consumer, 62 a denial of 
state standing would frustrate antitrust policy. Granting foreign 
governments the right to sue does not benefit the American con-
sumer directly nor frustrate the law's purpose. Chief Justice Burger 
noted additionally that there is an important difference between 
states and foreign nations.63 
Foreign nations possess their own effective redress against 
American anticompetitive practices.64 Unhampered by the doctrines 
of federalism, foreign governments are free to enforce their own 
antitrust laws. Though their own laws are contained by jurisdic-
tional limitations, they still represent a viable remedy not available 
to American states. Chief Justice Burger concluded by stressing the 
economic differences between individual states and foreign nations. 
Foreign nations often engage in anticompetitive activities. It pre-
sents a strange anomaly to protect foreign nations from practices in 
treble damage remedy within the antitrust Acts was to encourage 
cannot act in contravention to federal antitrust policies.66 
59. 434 U.S. at 318, citing 316 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1942). 
60. 434 U.S. at 326. 
61. Id. 
62. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 n.10 (1977) . 
63. 434 U.S. at 327-28. 
64. Id. at 327. 
65. Id. 
66. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S . 197, 332, 334-47 (1904) . But 
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The majority in Pfizer did not directly refute Chief Justice 
Burger's dissent. However, the Court stated in a footnote that boy-
cotts and cartels are not "available to a foreign nation faced with 
monopolistic control of the supply of medicines needed for the 
health and safety of its people."67 It can be argued that only under 
compelling circumstances can foreign governments sue for treble 
damages. However such a strict reading of the Pfizer opinion defies 
the Court's reasoning in Evans. 68 Foreign governments are in an 
analogous position to that of the states. Each state can sue under 
its own antitrust laws against anticompetitive practices.69 
In Evans the Court held that states can sue for treble damages 
under the Sherman Act. The question of whether an adequate state 
remedy existed was not addressed. The Pfizer decision is only con-
sistent with the Evans holding when construed liberally. Although 
the Pfizer decision is not clearly supported by case law, a study of 
the legislative history of the antitrust acts provides added support 
for the Court's holding. 
B. Legislative History 
Congress did not consider the rights of foreign governments 
when it enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts.7° Congress' concern 
was domestic-to foster competition within the American market. 71 
Although the Court in Pfizer found the legislative history of the acts 
inconclusive as to foreign state standing, it was able to use the 
legislative background to delineate and explore congressional pur-
pose more precisely. Though protection of an American free market 
economy was the purpose behind the antitrust laws, the Court rea-
soned that this purpose was not dispositive. A definition of 
"persons" which included foreign corporations indicated broader 
congressional purpose than mere domestic protection. In his dis-
senting opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that there was no legis-
see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Parker v . Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (194~~) 
(cases where the Court has found certain state actions to be exempt from the federal antitrust 
laws). For limitations on this doctrine, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 
773 (1975). See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, 731-39 (1977); 
see also Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulations, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. 1469 
(1961). 
67. 434 U.S. at 318 n.18. 
68. 316 U.S. 159 (1942). 
69. See State Laws, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 30,000 (1977). 
70. 434 U.S. at 312; 316 U.S. at 162; 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941). 
71. See A. KALES, H. THORELLI, supra note 8. 
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lative support for the majority's opinion. If Congress intended for-
eign governments to sue for treble damages it would have included 
nations within the definition of "person." It is not the Court's func-
tion to speculate about supposed congressional intent when the 
issue in question was admittedly never considered.72 
The legislative environment at the time of the passage of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts sheds little light on congressional in-
tent. 73 In 1871 Congress enacted statutes which defined general 
terms, in a sense creating its own dictionary.74 At first, "person" was 
defined to include body politics and corporate beings.75 Body poli-
tics was later deleted from the definition because the word was too 
comprehensive.78 Congress did not believe that governments were 
"persons" in the general sense of the word.77 It is highly questionable 
whether this intent was still controlling twenty years later when the 
Sherman Act was passed. Today there still exists a general defini-
tion of "person. " 78 However, the Supreme Court has never looked to 
the general definition to define "person" in the antitrust Acts. 711 
Sovereigns have also been allowed to sue under legislation where 
"person" is not defined to include body politics.80 Legislative history 
is a tool the courts may use to discern congressional intent. Yet it 
is often not persuasive or clear. An examination of the antitrust 
72. 434 U.S. at 329. 
73. See 550 F.2d 396, 399-400 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
74. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 527, 
536 (1947). 
75. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74-75. 
76. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431-32. See Final Report of The Commission to 
Revise and Codify the Laws of the United States 11 (1909). 
77. Blackstone defined "person" to include body politics: 
Persons also are divided by the law into either natural persons, or artificial. Natural 
persons are such as the God of nature formed us, artificial are such as are created 
and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government, which are 
called corporations or body politic. 
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 122 (rev. ed. 1871), quoted in Helver-
ing v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 92 (1934). 
78. "lTJhe words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies, associations, 
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies as well as individuals." 1 U.S.C. § 
1 (1976). 
79. See 434 U.S. at 313; Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942); United States v. Cooper 
Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). 
80. See California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585 (1944) (Shipping Act of 1916); 316 
U.S. at 161 (Sherman Act); 203 U.S. at 396; United States v. General Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp. 
197, 207 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (Clayton Act). Contra, Greenspan v. Crosbie, [1976-1977 Transfer 
Binder! FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,780 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (1934 Securities Act). Here, 
however, legislative intent is clear. 
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statutes and their construction may help define the meaning of 
"person." 
C. Statutory Construction 
The Pfizer Court stated, "[t]he word 'person' ... is not a 
term of art with a fixed meaning wherever it is used . . . ."Kt Exami-
nation of a statute in its entirety is more reliable than overly me-
chanical or technical approaches.82 
Statutes employing the term "person" will not ordinarily be 
construed to include the sovereign.83 The Court employed this pre-
sumption to deny the United States the right to sue for treble dam-
ages. 84 This presumption originated in the English common law 
immunity of the crown and was adopted by American jurisprud-
ence.85 Cooper relied on United States v. Fox, 88 where the Court, in 
defining "person" in a New York State statute, stated: 
The term 'person' as here used applies to natural persons, and 
also to artificial persons,-bodies politic, deriving their existence 
and powers from legislation,-but cannot be so extended to include 
within its meaning the Federal government. It would require an 
express definition to that effect to give it a sense thus extended.117 
However, this presumption has not always been applied. In Stanley 
v. Schwalby, 88 the Court held that the word "person" in a statute 
would include the United States as a body politic and corporate 
being.89 In determining whether states or municipalities could sue 
under the Sherman Act the presumption raised in Fox was not 
controlling. 90 
Other rules of statutory construction do not clarify whether the 
meaning of "person" should be extended to the sovereign. In United 
States v. Wise, 111 the Court stated that statutes should be construed 
81. 434 U.S. at 315. 
82. Id. at 313. 
83. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947); United States v. 
Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 321 (1876). But 
see Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 517 (1893). 
84. 312 U.S. at 604-05. 
85. 3 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 62.01 (4th ed. 1974). 
86. 94 U.S. 315 (1876). 
87. Id. at 321. 
88. 147 U.S. 508 (1893). 
89. Id. at 517. 
90. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161 (1942) (states); Chattanooga Foundry v. 
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipalities). 
91. 370 U.S. 405 (1962). 
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with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of passage. 112 
Since a sovereign's right to sue for treble damages was not consid-
ered at the time of passage, 93 this rule does not provide assistance. 
Another rule that is inconclusive is that a foreign sovereign 
should be placed in the same position as a body corporate. 114 Apply-
ing this presumption to the antitrust statutes, however, results in 
two opposing conclusions. In Pfizer, Justice Stewart found that for-
eign governments and states were in an analogous position,115 while 
Chief Justice Burger believed that foreign nations should be com-
pared with the United States.96 
A number of statutory rules of construction could preclude sov-
ereign nations from being considered as within the meaning of 
"person." One such rule is that the inclusion of the specific will 
exclude the unspecified.117 If one applies this presumption to the 
antitrust statutes it would follow that sovereigns should be ex-
cluded. However, if one applies a different presumption, the unspec-
ified term-sovereign-may fall within the definition of "person." 
In defining "person," the Clayton Act used the word "include."1111 
The term "include" indicates that the listing is descriptive rather 
than restrictive. 911 The Pfizer Court relied upon this presumption, 100 
which is also consistent with the ruling of the Court in Evans. 1111 If 
sovereigns were excluded from the definition of "persons," the states 
could not have been granted standing to sue for treble damages. 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated that the Court will 
not rewrite ambiguous legislation without finding support in the 
legislative history. 102 The Court could not follow this presumption 
92. Id. at 411. 
93. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 396, 399-400 (8th Cir. 1976) (Ross, J. 
concurring), aff'd, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
94. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134-35 n.2 (1938). 
95. 434 U.S. at 313-14. 
96. Id. at 321-22. 
97. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 
458 (1974); Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). 
98. "The word 'person' or 'persons' wherever used in this Act shall be deemed to include 
.... " 15 u.s.c. § 12 (1976). 
99. Cf. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99-100 (1941); Helver-
ing v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1 (1934) (both cases construe tax statutes). 
100. "The Sherman and Clayton Acts each provide that the word person 'shall be 
deemed to include . .. .'It is apparent that this definition is inclusive rather than exclusive, 
and does not by itself imply that a foreign government, any more than a natural person, falls 
without its bounds." 434 U.S. at 312 n.9. 
101. 316 U.S. 159 (1942). 
102. 434 U.S. at 325; See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210-11 (1976); 
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. at 606. 
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without disaffirming its holding in Evans. In 1914, prior to the 
Evans case, Congress specifically rejected an amendment authoriz-
ing state attorney generals the right to enforce the antitrust stat-
utes.103 Denying individual states the same rights as those possessed 
by the United States left the individual states without a clear statu-
tory remedy. The presumption that such a display of legislative 
intent precluded an expansion of Sherman Act jurisdiction is not 
supported by case law. 104 
In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 105 upon 
examining the Sherman Act, the Court said, "[l]anguage more 
comprehensive is difficult to conceive. On its face it shows a careful 
studied attempt to bring within the Act every person engaged in 
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial 
intercourse among the states. " 106 The statutory scheme is broad and 
comprehensive. Exceptions to the antitrust laws are construed nar-
rowly and should be limited unless explicitly sanctioned by Con-
gress.107 In one such limitation, the Webb-Pomerone Act, 1011 Congress 
drafted a narrow exception to the antitrust laws for export activity 
which otherwise would violate the Sherman Act. 1011 However, Con-
gress did not specifically exclude foreign nations from the Act. 110 
The antitrust laws are remedial in nature and as such are broadly 
construed. 111 
103. 51 CONG. REC. 14519-27 (1914), cited in 316 U.S. at 161. 
104. See 316 U.S. 159 (1942); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). 
105. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
106. Id. at 553. 
107. See FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pacific 
Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217-18, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966). 
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976). 
109. Id. § 62. The Act exempts export trade associations from the antitrust laws as long 
as the associations do not substantially lessen American domestic competition. In Pfizer, the 
majority and dissent used the Webb-Pomerone Act in support of their positions. Compare 
434 U.S. at 314 n.12 with 434 U.S. at 323 n.l. 
110. The Clayton Act includes foreign corporations within its definition of "person." 15 
U.S.C. § 12 (1976). The Webb-Pomerone Act excludes foreigners in a limited fashion. Con-
gress has never specifically addressed the rights of foreign governments. However, Congress 
was conscious of them in the aforementioned acts. Through these indirect actions it does not 
appear that Congress intended to hamper foreign governments' rights. 
111. See Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 2:l6 
( 1948); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944); West 
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 1964). See 
also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 66, at 14. Interpretation and enforcement of the antitrust acts 
were left to the ongoing adjudication of the courts. As the litigated questions became more 
novel, the courts left the common law and relied on the legislative heritage and purpose 
behind the Act. 
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The Pfizer Court chose a reasonable path in granting foreign 
governments antitrust standing; to do otherwise would frustrate the 
purpose behind the Acts. The purpose and not the literal words 
should be followed. 112 In light of the Court's expansive reading of the 
antitrust acts, the Pfizer decision should be liberally construed. 
There are no rules of construction which demand a reading of the 
antitrust acts that centers on the remedies available. The Court 
found the two purposes behind section 4 of the Clayton Act to be 
deterrence of violators and compensation of victims. 113 Only a broad 
interpretation of the Pfizer decision would satisfy these goals fully. 
Exceptions to the Clayton Act are to be strictly construed114 since 
there is no congressional mandate limiting the rights of foreign 
governments to sue for treble damages. Therefore, the Pfizer opinion 
should be liberally interpreted. 
The canons of construction, like the legislative history, are in.:. 
conclusive as to the precise meaning of "person." Stronger guide-
lines are found in examination of the policy behind the antitrust 
statutes and the effect of international enforcement on the United 
States. 
D. Policy 
In Pfizer, the Court said that denial of foreign plaintiffs' stand-
ing would defeat the two purposes of the antitrust Acts. 115 Violators 
would keep the "fruits of their illegality," and the foreign govern-
ments would remain uncompensated.116 The Court believed that 
business conduct outside the United States could affect economic 
activity within this country .117 The reason Congress included the 
treble damage remedy within the antitrust Acts was to encourage 
individuals to sue, thereby increasing the deterrent effect of the 
112. United States v. Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). 
113. 434 U.S. at 314; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 420 U.S. 477, 485-
86 (1977); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. 
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). 
114. See FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pacific 
Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217-18, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966) . 
115. 434 U.S. at 314. 
116. Id. 
117. In footnote 14, the Court stated that it is possible that denying foreign governments 
the right to sue may adversely effect the American consumer by contributing to inflation, 
encouraging monopoly pricing, and allowing antitrust violators to accumulate illegal profit. 
This result was suggested by Velvet, Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 
1, 7-8 (1975) . 434 U.S. at 315 n.14. 
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law. 118 Greater deterrence affords more protection to the American 
consumer. 
Proscribed business conduct outside the United States has been 
regulated by American antitrust statutes in the past. 1111 In United 
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 120 the United States brought 
an action against a domestic corporation for conspiring with foreign 
corporations to restrain trade. 121 It was also held in United States 
v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n122 that the price fixing of alkalis 
outside the United States constituted a Sherman Act violation. 123 In 
both cases, the anticompetitive activity had the potential to ad-
versely affect the American economy. 124 Both cases also aided in 
deterring future violators by increasing antitrust prosecution. The 
Pfizer Court adhered to the principle that the American market 
would be further damaged by this anticompetitive activity .125 In a 
similar and related case, In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions (Kuwait 
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.)'21 a federal district court addressed the issue 
of whether it was essential to allow foreign governments to sue for 
treble damages to effectively enforce the antitrust laws. The court 
answered the question by stating that "the fundamental goals of the 
antitrust laws could be seriously frustrated by not permitting Ku-
wait to maintain a treble damage action for damages resulting from 
the alleged conspiracy."127 It was also noted that a successful mo-
nopoly controls both the domestic and the foreign market. 1211 In 
Pfizer the pharmaceutical companies had control of both of these 
markets. 129 
In his dissent in Pfizer, Chief Justice Burger stated his belief 
118. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). 
See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969); Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Radiant Burners, Inc., v. Peoples Gas 
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 655, 659-60 (1961); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American 
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948). 
119. See generally W. FUGATE, supra note 43, at 144-72. 
120. 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified & aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
121. 83 F. Supp. at 294. 
122. 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
123. Id. at 66-68. But see the Webb-Pomerone Act, sections 1-6, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 
(1976), where price-fixing abroad by United States exporting companies is allowed with 
government approval. 
124. If the price-fixing activity were not present in the foreign market it might be possi-
ble to import the products into the United States and at least create greater competition. 
125. 434 U.S. at 315 n.14. 
126. 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
127. Id. at 316-17. 
128. Id. 
129. 434 U.S. at 310. 
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that foreign nations have adequate remedies available to counter 
antitrust activity without relying on American law. However, al-
though foreign nations can enact their own antitrust statutes, 130 this 
may not provide an adequate solution. Foreign governments would 
have to overcome jurisdictional131 and political problems, 132 as well 
as possible retaliatory measures by American companies. When for-
eign governments are forced to purchase American commodities 
because they have a critical need and lack an alternative product 
or market, this becomes an even more untenable solution. 133 The 
respondents in Pfizer had the choice of either buying price-fixed 
goods or denying their citizens medicine. Boycotting the American 
pharmaceutical market was not a realistic alternative. 
Chief Justice Burger would not condone granting treble damage 
actions to foreign governments when they participate in the price-
fixing of their own goods on the world market. 134 To affix the crite-
rion of permitting only governments with "clean hands" the right 
to sue under the antitrust Acts is not within the Court's discretion. 135 
First, in allowing foreign governments to sue, an additional deter-
rent is added to stem antitrust activity within the United States. 136 
Second, once a foreign government steps into an American court to 
assert a claim, it may be subject to counterclaims. 137 Whether a 
130. Id. at 315 n.14. It is interesting to note that the respondents India and the Philip-
pines have enacted antitrust legislation. See India Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Act, (1969), 14 INDIA A.L.R. MANUAL 657 (1972); PHILIPPINES REV. PENAL CODE art. 186 
(1972). 
131. Chief Justice Burger admitted that there are jurisdictional problems; however, he 
did not believe the problems were insurmountable. 434 U.S. at 327. 
132. Nations that have a socialistic or communistic market structure could not, without 
altering their economic philosophy, enact antitrust statutes. Antitrust statutes are designed 
to foster a free market system which is based on the following assumptions: (1) a large number 
of noninfluential buyers and sellers; (2) each seller's product is undifferentiated and indistin-
guishable from any rival seller's product; (3) there are no barriers to market entry; (4) no 
artificial restraints on supply, demand, price, or mobility exist; and (5) each buyer and seller 
has complete market information. J. KOCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRICES 17 (1974). 
133. 434 U.S. at 318 n.18. 
134. Id. at 328. 
135. See Id. at 320-21. Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion, questioned the right of 
the Court to decide an issue of such international consequences. The Court's decision fell 
within its constitutional powers. However assessing foreign governments' morality is not. If 
the Court required "clean hands" to enter into litigation, Justice Powell's dissent would 
certainly be applicable. 
136. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Perma 
Life Mufflers, Inc . v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); E. TIMBERLAKE, 
supra note 4. 
137. See Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); The Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a),(b), 1607 (1976) . 
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court decides to hear those claims depends on the sovereign immun-
ity138 and act of state doctrines. 139 If the American defendant was 
directly injured140 by the foreign nation's anticompetitive proprie-
tary activity, 141 he could invoke the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
A narrow interpretation of the Pfizer decision would limit the 
beneficial effect of deterring anticompetitive activity. It would also 
hamper American courts by forcing them to decide when foreign 
governments were compelled to enter the American market to ob-
tain vital goods. Extended litigation to determine compelling need 
would benefit neither the American public nor the foreign govern-
ments. 
The policy behind antitrust legislation does not hinge on 
whether another remedy is available. The Sherman Act supple-
ments the common law. 142 Indeed, the drafters of the Sherman Act 
believed that they were clarifying those illegal acts that were pro-
hibited at common law. 143 Treble damage actions were included 
within the Act to encourage individuals to sue, 144 and not to supply 
the sole redress for victims of anticompetitive activity. Limiting 
foreign governments access to the courts would be in contravention 
of the broad purpose behind antitrust legislation. 
IV CONCLUSION 
The underlying purpose of antitrust legislation is to protect the 
American ideal of a free market economy .145 In particular, section 4 
of the Clayton Act granting a treble damage remedy attempts to 
deter violators and compensate victims of anticompetitive activity. 
138. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605 (a),(b), 1607 (1976). 
139. The act of state doctrine dictates that every sovereign respect the laws and inde-
pendence of every other sovereign, and not sit in judgment of its internal acts. Underhill v. 
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 72-74 (1977); New 
York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 352-5:~. :~61 
N.E.2d 963, 968-69, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317-18 (1977). 
140. The drug companies in Pfizer could not have sued, (for example, respondent Iran) 
for fixing the price of oil because they did not directly purchase oil from Iran. The Court, in 
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), held that indirect purchasers cannot collect 
for passed on damages caused by antitrust violations. 
141. A foreign government does not have the right to exercise sovereign immunity when 
acting in its proprietary capacity. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 69:~-
94 (1976). 
142. See H. THORELLI, supra note 8, at 226-29. 
143. See Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REV. 
221 (1956). 
144. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); E. 
TIMBERLAKE, supra note 4. 
145. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 1. 
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The Pfizer decision arguably satisfies these goals by allowing foreign 
governments to sue for antitrust violations. 
The decision, however, will require further judicial refinement 
in order to ascertain its full scope. A broad interpretation, allowing 
foreign governments to sue without restriction, as opposed to the 
narrower view, restricting standing to compelling circumstances, 
will further the purposes behind the antitrust Acts. The Acts do not 
require a plaintiff to come into court with "clean hands." It should 
not be within the purview of the Court to decide the compelling need 
of a foreign government. 
Jannet L. Gurian 
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